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gMonopoly: Does Search Bias Warrant Antitrust or
Regulatory Intervention?
ANDREW LANGFORD∗
INTRODUCTION
The Internet continues to grow explosively. In December 2008, the Internet had
one billion users.1 By June 2012, that number had reached 2.4 billion, or roughly a
third of the earth’s population.2 As early as 2002, our refrigerators and microwaves
began using the Internet.3
Without search engines, the Internet’s explosive growth would not be possible.
Users would only be able to visit websites by knowing the website’s URL or by
clicking a link from another website.4 In essence, the Internet would be like a planet
where nobody had a map.5 Search engines like Bing, Google, and Yahoo! provide
that map.
As the cartographers of the Internet, search engines wield great power. 6 And, as
search engines have expanded their product offerings beyond the traditional “ten
blue links” search,7 competitors have begun to allege that search engines are
abusing their power. While the allegations of anticompetitive conduct are legion,8
this Note is concerned with only one: search bias. Search bias, as the term is used

∗ J.D. Candidate, 2013, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. The author would
like to thank his father, mother, brother, and sister for their love and support.
1. Dawn Kawamoto, Internet Users Worldwide Surpass 1 Billion, CNET NEWS (Jan. 23,
2009, 4:35 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10149534-93.html.
2. World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS (2012),
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.
3. See LG Internet Refrigerator Is at the Heart of the Digital Home Network,
BESTSTUFF (Jan. 14, 2002), http://www.beststuff.com/lg-internet-refrigerator-is-at-the-heartof-the-digital-home-network/.
4. See Thad Collins, Searching the Internet Without Search Engines,
STREETDIRECTORY, http://www.streetdirectory.com/travel_guide/2317/computers_and_the_
internet/searching_the_internet_without_search_engines.html.
5. Google Chairman Eric Schmidt has likened search engines to a GPS for the internet. See
Hayley Tsukayama, Google’s Eric Schmidt Defends the Company’s Search Practices,
WASHINGTON POST (Sept 21, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/posttech/post/googles-eric-schmidt-defends-the-companys-search-practices/2011/09/21/gIQAR
7AllK_blog.html.
6. Some even say if you are not on Google’s search results, you might as well not
exist. See Rick Mans, If You Are Not in Google, You Don’t Exist, DON’T MIND RICK (Jan. 29,
2010), http://dontmindrick.com/opinion/you-not-in-google-dont-exist.
7. “Ten blue links” refers to the classic Google search results page. In its original
incarnation, Google merely returned a list of ten blue links, whereas today various images
and decoration may appear surrounding the search results. Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican,
Competitors’ Proposed Remedies for Search Bias: Search “Neutrality” and Other
Proposals, J. INTERNET L., May 2012, at 1, 10.
8. Press Release, Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, European Comm’n for
Competition Policy, Statement of VP Almunia on the Google Antitrust Investigation (May
21, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-372_en.htm?locale
=en (reciting four areas of “concern” in the European Commission’s antitrust investigation).
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in this Note, occurs when a search engine changes its search rankings for some
illicit purpose, such as inhibiting the ability of consumers to find competitors’
websites.9 Several parties have proposed that alleged search bias by Google may
constitute an antitrust violation due to Google’s dominance in search.10 These
accusations were scrutinized in a large scale investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) that ended in early 2013 when the FTC concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to bring an enforcement action against Google.11 But the
FTC has indicated that its investigation may reopen in the future if further evidence
comes to light, and that Google’s leadership in the search engine industry will
render it a continuing target of regulatory scrutiny.12 The FTC’s European Union
counterpart is also still conducting its own investigation.13 In addition to
governmental investigations, a growing body of legal scholarship is now analyzing
the myriad issues raised by attempting to remedy search bias.14
Though search engines wield substantial power, the nature of the Internet makes
evaluating antitrust claims against search engines vexing. The role of search
engines as key Internet intermediaries tempts one to analogize search engines to
industries that have traditionally been the subject of antitrust scrutiny and
government regulation, such as telecommunications providers, railroads, and
electric utilities.15 Seizing on these similarities and on perceived barriers to entry,
some commentators have argued for a regulation of search.16 However, these
analogies are not so cut and dry in a market where users can switch products at zero
cost and new entrants cannot be excluded from competition.
This Note explores the antitrust implications, under § 2 of the Sherman Act,17 of
a dominant search engine manipulating its search results to gain a competitive

9. This Note’s use of the term “search bias” thus does not include any manipulation of
search engine results. Rather, this Note uses the term in the sense of bias premised on some
anticompetitive purpose.
10. See Foundem’s Google Story, SEARCH NEUTRALITY.ORG (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.searchneutrality.org/eu-launches-formal-investigation/foundem-google-story;
Juan Carlos Perez, FairSearch.org Urges AGs to Tackle Google Over Antitrust,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 11, 2011 2:23 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9220730/FairSearch.org_urges_AGs_to_tackle_Google_over_antitrust.
11. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices,
Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter FTC Google Statement],
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf.
12. Id. at 4.
13. See, e.g., Carol Matlack & Stephanie Bodoni, Google’s EU Antitrust Proposal Will
Likely Be Tweaked, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.business
week.com/articles/2013-04-15/googles-eu-antitrust-proposal-will-likely-see-tweaks.
14. See infra Part III (discussing various proposals and arguments for regulating search
bias).
15. See generally Viva R. Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 475
(2009) (tracing the debate over search engine regulation).
16. See generally id.
17.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
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advantage in other markets. Google, which now offers a number of its own
nonsearch services and is currently considered by many to wield monopoly power
in search, will be used as an exemplar.
Part I of this Note explains how search engines work and how they finance
themselves, and it also describes the various products that search engines are now
offering beyond traditional search. These additional products provide search
engines with a financial incentive to manipulate search results for the benefit of
their own products and to the detriment of competitors. Search bias is thus likely to
be a continuing object of regulatory and antitrust scrutiny.
Part II will discuss a hypothetical § 2 monopolization claim against Google
premised on search result bias. An analysis of Google’s business requires resolving
difficult antitrust problems. Among them are how to analyze multisided markets
and whether antitrust law can impose liability based on services that are offered for
free. This Note concludes that antitrust enforcement premised on search bias is not
supported by precedent, and that any antitrust remedy would be problematic. Part
III will analyze various grounds and proposals for regulating search bias, and will
make its own proposal.
I. SEARCH ENGINES—HOW THEY WORK, HOW THEY ARE FINANCED, AND HOW
THEY ARE EXPANDING
An introduction to the inner workings and business models of search engines is
necessary to understand the antitrust issues that search bias presents. As such, this
Part will provide the necessary material to understand the world of search.
A. How Search Engines Work
A search engine must perform two basic tasks: (1) the search engine must map
the content available on the Internet and (2) in response to a user’s search terms, the
search engine must employ an algorithm to provide a list of the most relevant
“organic” search results.18
A search engine discovers content on the Internet using programs called
“crawlers.”19 A crawler begins with a list of “seed” URLs.20 The crawler will
examine the web pages attached to the seed URLs and record any links contained
on these pages.21 The crawler will then visit the links it has recorded and repeat the

exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or
by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
18. “Organic” refers to the search results that an algorithm will produce without
tampering. See, e.g., Parts Geek, LLC v. U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc., No. 09-5578, 2010
WL 1381005, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2010).
19. MARK LEVENE, AN INTRODUCTION TO SEARCH ENGINES AND WEB NAVIGATION 82
(2d ed. 2010).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 82−83.

1562

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1559

crawling process.22 This is a never-ending cycle that allows new content on the
Internet to be continuously discovered and made available in search results.23
As the crawler explores pages, the content of those pages is copied and
“indexed.”24 The search engine’s index must then be evaluated for relevancy by the
search engine’s algorithm in response to queries.25 The algorithm is what
differentiates a good search engine from a bad one.26
Google’s PageRank algorithm was pioneering. Rather than simply looking to the
number of times a term appears on a page, as earlier search algorithms had done,
PageRank places the heaviest weighting on the number of times other websites link
to a page.27 Today, the PageRank algorithm employs over two hundred factors.28
PageRank received roughly 550 tweaks in 2010 and the process of perfecting it is
ongoing.29
Highlighting the economic importance of search engines, a search engine
optimization (SEO) cottage industry has risen up around Google, with consultants
purporting to be able to manipulate Google’s ranking system.30 Google plays a
constant cat-and-mouse game with the SEO industry, and the company is known to
penalize websites that try to cheat the system by banishing them to the back pages
of the search results.31
B. How Search Engines Are Financed
Most search engines, like radio and television broadcasters, provide free
services that are financed by advertising revenues.32 This advertising usually comes
in the form of paid advertisements that appear separate from organic search

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 81.
25. Steven Levy, Exclusive: How Google’s Algorithm Rules the Web, WIRED MAGAZINE
(Feb. 22, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/02/ff_google_algorithm/
all/1.
26. See LEVENE, supra note 19, at 80 (describing the algorithm as the “heart of the
search engine”).
27. Levy, supra note 25. The original PageRank algorithm is the subject of a patent that
expires in 2017. U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998). The patent is assigned to
Stanford University, which granted Google an exclusive license to the patent. Lisa M.
Krieger, Stanford Earns $336 Million Off Google Stock, REDORBIT (Dec. 1, 2005), http://
www.redorbit.com/news/education/318480/stanford_earns_336_million_off_google_stock.
28. Levy, supra note 25. For example, depending on what is being searched for,
PageRank may rank new pages as more relevant than older pages, as in the case of breaking
news stories. See id.
29. Id.
30. See David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of Search, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/business/13search.html (outlining instances of “black
hat” SEO).
31. For example, Google demoted J.C. Penney’s search results after the search engine
determined that J.C. Penney had tried to manipulate the system in violation of Google’s SEO
policies. Id.
32. See generally James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Online Advertising: Defining
Relevant Markets, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 653 (2010).

2013]

gMONOPOLY

1563

results.33 Just as with search results, Google has implemented an innovative
strategy called AdWords, originally pioneered by a company called Overture, that
has catapulted it to the top of the heap.34
AdWords is an auction-based system for search results advertising that allows
advertisers to bid on keywords.35 So, an advertiser who bids on the word
“computer” is bidding to have his advertisement displayed when a user performs a
search involving the term “computer.”36 Thus, in the auction process, very common
words will receive higher bids and more obscure search terms will receive lower
bids.37 Because the auction process is triggered by the search terms a user enters, an
auction takes place in real time whenever a user googles something.38
Simply placing the highest bid, however, does not ensure that a bidder’s
advertisement will appear on Google’s sponsored links. To compute whose ads will
be displayed, Google also utilizes “Quality Scores.”39 Quality Scores are calculated
using criteria similar to PageRank. A number of factors go into a Quality Score,
including the relevance of the ad to the search terms, the quality of the page that the
ad links to, the percentage of times users click on the ad when it appears, and many
other factors that Google keeps secret.40 This means that a website with relevant,
high quality content will appear as an advertisement on Google more cheaply than
an advertiser with lower quality results. The system allows Google to exercise
some automated quality control over the ads it displays, and Google believes the
process is more profitable than a highest-bidder-take-all system.41

33. See Commercial Alert Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of
Adver. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Gary Ruskin, Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (June
27, 2002) [hereinafter Commercial Alert Letter], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/
staff/commercialalertletter.shtm.
34. Steven Levy, Secret of Googlenomics: Data-Fueled Recipe Brews Profitability,
WIRED MAGAZINE (May 22, 2009), http://www.wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/
17-06/nep_googlenomics.
35. Id.
36. See id.; see also Larry Kim, The Most Expensive Keywords in Google AdWords,
WORDSTREAM (July 18, 2011), http://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2011/07/18/mostexpensive-google-adwords-keywords (listing the top twenty most expensive keywords).
37. This is known as the “Keyword Pricing Index.” See Levy, supra note 34. Words like
“flowers” and “hotels” are coveted search terms and so are almost always bid up to high
prices. Id. Some terms will vary in value seasonally, like “snowboarding.” Id. “Long tails”
are obscure terms that will almost always be available at a low auction price, which provides
niche businesses with the ability to competitively bid for highly specialized terms. See id.
38. See id. That means that 13.4 billion AdWords auctions were performed in October
2011, or about 5000 per second. See Press Release, comScore, comScore Releases October
2011 U.S. Search Engine Rankings (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://www.comscore.com/
Insights/Press_Releases/2011/11/comScore_Releases_October_2011_U.S._Search_Engine_
Rankings (reporting that in October 2011 Google received 13.4 billion search requests).
39. Levy, supra note 34.
40. Id.
41. See id. Google has expanded on the success of its AdWords program with AdSense.
See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case
Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 194 (2011). AdSense
customers place Google’s sponsored link advertising on their websites instead of using
traditional banner advertising. See id. In essence, AdSense places Google’s advertising
program on participating websites—the ads are still dynamic and depend on the content of
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Google had revenues of $23.6 billion in 2009, 99% of which was advertising
revenue.42 In the first quarter of 2010, 66% of Google’s revenue came from
advertising on Google websites, 30% from advertising on Google network
websites,43 and the remaining 4% came from “other revenues.”44
C. How Search Engines Are Expanding
In the search industry, search engines can be conceptually divided between
“horizontal” search and “vertical” search.45 Horizontal search engines provide
search results that encompass the entire spectrum of Internet material—they are
designed so that one can search for anything.46 Vertical search engines, by contrast,
are specialized search engines designed to provide search results that are tailored to
a particular area.47 For example, Nextag is a vertical search engine that provides
price comparisons for various products.48 Google is a horizontal search engine.
When users type a product name into Google’s horizontal search product, unlike in
Nextag, they may get a variety of search results. For example, users might see
product reviews, the manufacturer’s website, or retailers offering the product for
sale. Google also formerly offered Google Product Search, a price comparison
website that competed with Nextag.49 In mid-2012, Google Product Search was
replaced with Google Shopping.50 Google Shopping is the first search service
offered by Google that requires merchants to pay as a condition of being listed in
the search results—a practice known as “paid inclusion.”51 When this Note was
originally drafted, Google Shopping had yet to be announced. That illustrates how
quickly the search industry evolves.
In 2007, Google introduced Universal Search,52 a system that is likely to be
central to some of the antitrust claims against Google. Universal Search evaluates
the user’s search terms and attempts to determine exactly what type of answer the

the website they appear on, just like the ads that appear on Google’s own website. See id.
42. Jim Edwards, Google’s Revenue Breakdown Shows It Controls Even More
Advertising Than You’d Think, CBS NEWS (May 25, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://www.cbsnews.
com/8301-505123_162-42744932/googles-revenue-breakdown-shows-it-controls-even-more
-advertising-than-youd-think.
43. Google network websites are websites that participate in AdSense. See The Google
Network, GOOGLE, http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=
6104.
44. Google Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 26 (May 5, 2010).
45. See Danny Sullivan, Google Launches “Universal Search” & Blended Results,
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 16, 2007, 2:33 PM), http://searchengineland.com/google-20google-universal-search-11232.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See About Nextag, NEXTAG, http://www.nextag.com/about/main.
49. What Is Google Product Search?, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/checkout/sell/
bin/answer.py?hl=en-GB&answer=64947.
50. Danny Sullivan, Google Product Search to Become Google Shopping, Use Pay-toPlay Model, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 31, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://searchengineland.com/
google-product-search-to-become-google-shopping-use-pay-to-play-model-122959.
51. Id.
52. Sullivan, supra note 45.
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user is searching for.53 For example, if a user types in a street address, Google may
determine that the user is searching for directions to that location.54 Google then
displays a link to its own map service, Google Maps, often at a high position in the
search results.55 The Google Maps result is also set off from the other results with
larger text and a picture of a map, while the rest of the search results appear as
normal blue links.56 Clicking on the link will take the user to the Google Maps
page, where more Google ads appear.57 Bing and Yahoo! (which is powered by
Bing’s technology) have similar functionality.58
II. A HYPOTHETICAL § 2 CLAIM AGAINST GOOGLE
This Part details the story of a real-life allegation of anticompetitive conduct
against Google and applies a § 2 analysis to it. For the purposes of the analysis, it
will be assumed that all conduct by Google is unilateral. That is, there is no
agreement or conspiracy between Google and another party to engage in
anticompetitive conduct. This limits the discussion to § 2 claims.59 The following
analysis attempts to maintain an objective viewpoint and it is not conclusive—
many issues involve facts that are unavailable, and the resolution of many legal
issues is unclear.
Foundem is a price comparison website operated out of the United Kingdom,
and the organization has become a noisy public critic of Google.60 The company is
one of nine that have filed formal complaints against Google in the European
Commission’s ongoing antitrust investigation.61 Foundem also filed comments with
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) encouraging the agency to
include search engines in the net neutrality regulatory agenda.62
Foundem’s beef with Google dates back several years and is recounted on the
organization’s activist website, Searchneutrality.org, created by Foundem to raise

53. See id.
54. See INSIDE GOOGLE, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, TRAFFIC REPORT: HOW GOOGLE IS
SQUEEZING OUT COMPETITORS AND MUSCLING INTO NEW MARKETS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/TrafficStudy-Google.pdf.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See Sullivan, supra note 45.
58. See generally JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, INT’L CTR. FOR LAW & ECON., DEFINING AND
MEASURING SEARCH BIAS: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE (2011), available at
http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/definingmeasuring.pdf (finding that Bing and
Yahoo! both exhibit greater search bias than Google).
59. “Independent actions taken by an entity fall outside the purview of § 1.” Virgin Atl.
Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 263 (2d Cir. 2001).
60. See Rob D. Young, Report: Google EU Antitrust Expands, Up to 9 Complainants,
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Aug. 3, 2011), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2098919/
Report-Google-EU-Antitrust-Expands-Up-to-9-Complainants.
61. Id.
62. ADAM RAFF & SHIVAUN RAFF, REPLY COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE
COMMISSION’S PRESERVING THE OPEN INTERNET NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (2012)
available at http://www.foundem.co.uk/FCC_Comments.pdf. Search neutrality was not
included in the FCC’s controversial net neutrality rules. See FCC Rep. 10-201 (Dec. 21,
2010).
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public awareness and to advocate for regulation of Google.63 In June 2006, Google
severely reduced Foundem’s PageRank and Quality Score.64 As a result of the
demotion, Foundem needed to bid one hundred times more to achieve the same
AdWords placement, and Foundem dropped several pages down in the search
results.65 After petitioning Google for several years, Google informed Foundem
that a change to its algorithm had caused the demotion. Google then manually
“whitelisted” Foundem from its AdWords penalty in 2007, and later restored its
PageRank in 2009.66 During that time Foundem’s rankings remained steady on both
Yahoo! and Bing.67 Foundem states that during the demotion, an exemplary query
resulted in Foundem ranking first on Yahoo!, seventh on Bing, and 144th on
Google.68 Following the whitelisting, the same search terms that had placed
Foundem 144th on Google now placed it in the fifth position.69 Foundem states that
its organic traffic from Google (i.e., traffic that did not come from advertising on
Google) jumped by roughly 10,000% “overnight” after the PageRank
whitelisting.70
Foundem alleges that during its demotion (and after), Google took steps to boost
the success of its own price comparison service, Google Product Search, by
inflating its position in the search results and by making Google Product Search
listings appear more conspicuous than other listings.71 For the purposes of the
antitrust analysis, the assumed facts are that Google demoted one or more
competitors’ rankings on its search engine, while simultaneously boosting its own
competing product’s search rankings, for the purpose of gaining a competitive
advantage.72 As will be seen below, virtually every aspect of an antitrust claim
against a dominant search engine would be problematic for a plaintiff, and the issue
of anticompetitive conduct is likely dispositive.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations.”73 This establishes three offenses: monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize.74 Only monopolization and

63. See About, SEARCH NEUTRALITY.ORG (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.searchneutrality.
org/about.
64. See Foundem’s Google Story, supra note 10.
65. Id. Recall that Google ranks AdWords bidders by both the amount of their bids and
the quality of their website (their Quality Score). Because Foundem’s Quality Score was
lowered, Foundem had to bid higher than before to compensate.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. In other words, like a court ruling on a motion to dismiss, Foundem’s allegations
will be taken as true.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 5 (2008) [hereinafter DOJ, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.
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attempted monopolization will be considered in this Note. A monopolization claim
will be evaluated, followed by a brief discussion of attempted monopolization.
Monopolization “has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in [a]
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.”75 To determine whether monopoly power
exists, courts begin by evaluating the firm’s market share, which in turn requires
that the court define a relevant market.76
A. Relevant Markets
A relevant market “is composed of products that have reasonable
interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced—price, use and
qualities considered.”77 In addition, the market must be limited in geographic
scope.78 Once the relevant market is defined, the court can then examine whether
monopoly power exists and whether it has been abused.
While parties such as Foundem do not compete directly with Google’s search
engine, and are instead downstream competitors, the likely claims of
anticompetitive conduct by entities like Foundem require Google’s general search
product to have a monopolistic share of a relevant market. Accordingly, this
analysis discusses how a court might characterize the markets for horizontal search
and search advertising, and foregoes a discussion of any downstream markets.
There has been considerable debate on how to define the relevant markets for
Internet-based companies,79 and the hypothetical case against Google also
implicates the broader discussion of how to assess relevant markets where a market
is multisided.

75. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570−71 (1966).
76. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965) (“Without a definition of [the] market there is no way to measure [the] ability to
lessen or destroy competition.”).
77. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). In Du
Pont, the Supreme Court determined that the relevant market for du Pont, producer of 70%
of cellophane in the United States, was “flexible packaging material[s]” because cellophane
was economically interchangeable with such products. Id. at 400. Du Pont’s analysis has
been criticized as the “Cellophane Fallacy” because, according to many commentators, du
Pont had already raised its prices to profit-maximizing monopoly levels. See DOJ,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 74, at 26. Under this view, the only reason that
any interchangeable products for cellophane existed was that du Pont had raised its prices to
the point that consumers would consider substitutes. Id. at 26−27. Thus, the Supreme Court
inferred there was no monopoly power, when in fact there likely was, by defining the
relevant market too broadly. Id.
78. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 395.
79. See, e.g., Bruce Abramson, Are “Online Markets” Real and Relevant? From the
Monster-HotJobs Merger to the Google-DoubleClick Merger, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
655 (2008); Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 32.
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1. Horizontal Search
The most obvious relevant market is, of course, horizontal search, defined
above.80 However, the scope of the relevant market for search engines is vigorously
debated, and Google itself has argued the market is so broad that it encompasses
virtually any means of searching for information.81 As the relevant market
definition is a question of fact that requires significant empirical research, this Part
will instead focus on certain novel antitrust issues implicated by search engine
business models.
One wrinkle in the relevant market analysis is that search engine services are
offered for free to users. In KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., a district court
ruled that horizontal search cannot be a relevant market because consumers do not
pay for it.82 This calls into question the antitrust analysis applicable to a multisided
market, an issue that is overlooked by the court’s opinion.
In a classic two-sided market an intermediary connects two distinct groups who
benefit one another via indirect network effects; that is, the value of a product to
Group A rises as more members of Group B use it, and vice versa.83 Credit cards
are one example.84 The credit card company acts as an intermediary, connecting
cardholders with merchants.85 Cardholders want cards that are accepted by most
merchants, and merchants want cards that customers expect them to accept.86 Thus,
there is a feedback loop between the parties. However, if the network effects are
well established, they may allow the intermediary to engage in monopolistic
practices because one side of the market will not respond to price increases on the
other side of the market.87

80. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
81. See John McDonnell, Eric Schmidt Admits Apple’s Siri May Pose ‘Competitive
Threat’ to Google, METRO (Nov. 7, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://metro.co.uk/2011/11/07/ericschmidt-admits-apples-siri-may-pose-competitive-threat-to-google-211676.
82. KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“KinderStart cites no authority indicating that antitrust law
concerns itself with competition in the provision of free services. Providing search
functionality may lead to revenue from other sources, but KinderStart has not alleged that
anyone pays Google to search. Thus, the Search Market is not a ‘market’ for purposes of
antitrust law.”).
83. See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets 1–2 (AEIBrookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Stud., Working Paper No. 02-13, 2002), available at
http://regulation2point0.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/04/phpMt.pdf. Evans discusses
an amusing case study of two-sided markets: Japanese dating clubs. Id. at 1. The clubs match
men and women by placing them on opposite sides of glass in a room. Id. Men then send women
missives via the wait staff to indicate their interest. Id. The two sides of the market in Japanese
dating clubs are men and women, but there is a mismatch in demand—far more men want to go
to the clubs than women. Id. To balance out the sexes, clubs often charge the men large
membership and entry fees, while women either enter for free or are paid to do so. Id.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST:
THEORY AND CASE STUDIES 463–64 (2012).
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According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), this would have occurred in the
proposed merger between First Data Corp. and Concord EFS, Inc., two of the
largest PIN debit network operators in the United States.88 After recognizing that
the “‘PIN debit market is two-sided in nature,’”89 the DOJ concluded that the
merged PIN networks could profitably hold up merchants for monopoly rents due
to merchants’ dependence on the network of cardholders.90 The DOJ found that a
rise in merchant fees would not appreciably affect cardholder demand because
cardholders would not perceive the increased costs.91 Hence, the cardholder side of
the market would not discipline the intermediary’s behavior on the merchant side. 92
As with debit card providers, feedback effects have probably become a one-way
street for Google. But the feedback effects may be slightly different. While
advertisers care about the number of consumers that visit Google, consumers likely
do not care about the number of advertisers or the cost of advertisements (unless
perhaps the number of advertisements becomes so onerous that the search engine
interface suffers).93 Instead, the primary concern of users is probably the quality of
Google’s search product. Accordingly, the feedback effect arises from the pressure
users place on Google to maintain the quality of its search product. Google must
respond to this pressure so that it can maintain a healthy, paying audience of
advertisers. However, the cases have yet to directly confront these issues in a
nuanced way.
For example, in GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., a district
court found that the market for Internet Yellow Pages was a relevant market
because the services, although free to consumers, had commercial value from
advertising revenues.94 That Internet Yellow Pages providers might be competing
with other forms of advertising did not seem to factor into the court’s analysis in
GTE. That oversight is troubling because it is not apparent that a single dominant
provider could charge higher advertising prices if other advertising venues compete
for the same business.95 Such an inquiry would be key to reaching a correct
decision in an antitrust case. In another recent decision, a Chinese court concluded

88. Id. at 461–63.
89. Id. at 463.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See Manne & Wright, supra note 41, at 208 (“Typical ‘feedback effects’ seen in
many multisided platforms are attenuated or absent in Google’s business because the effects
are generally unidirectional: advertisers want more end users, but end users care little or
nothing about the number of advertisers.”).
94. GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 42 (D.D.C.
1998); see also LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV06-6994AHM(RZx), 2007 WL
6865852, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (finding that “Internet-based social networking
websites” was a relevant market). The court used search engines as an example of an adsupported business that depends on a large number of consumers utilizing free services.
GTE, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 39; see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 87,
at 464 (discussing GTE).
95. See GTE, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (“[A]dvertising revenue in the Internet Yellow Pages
market substantially depends on the number of users accessing a particular website because
Internet advertisers are willing to pay higher advertisement rates on websites with a higher
volume of user traffic.”).
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that horizontal search is a relevant market because “[t]he free search service
provided by search engine providers to internet users is not equivalent to a free
service for charity, and may obtain actual or potential commercial benefits by
attracting internet users and employing advertisements or other marketing
services.”96
The law is unsettled on whether a free service can be a relevant market, and case
law has yet to grapple squarely with current thinking on two-sided markets.
However, the above authorities illustrate that courts and agencies are willing to find
a relevant market where a free service is supported by advertising revenues, or
where subsidizing one side of the market still allows the intermediary to profitably
charge supra-competitive rents on the other side.
2. Search Engine Advertising
There is a debate over whether this market should be limited to search engine
advertising (i.e., advertisements that appear on search engines), or expanded to
include all forms of web-based advertising, or even to include traditional
advertising media.97 Unlike the market for horizontal search, courts and agencies
have already weighed in on the relevant market for search engine advertising. One
district court concluded that the market should be defined as all Internet-based
advertising.98 On the other hand, the DOJ has concluded that “Internet search
advertising” and “Internet search syndication” are separate relevant markets.99
For its part, the FTC has concluded that “all online advertising does not
constitute a relevant antitrust market.”100 The FTC analyzed three separate markets:

96. R. Ian McEwin & Corinne Chew, China—The Baidu Decision, 6 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 223, 227 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The case involved
allegations that the Chinese search engine Baidu abused its market position by tying the
plaintiff’s search rankings to its continued participation in Baidu’s “Pay for Placement”
program. Id. at 225–26. The court ruled against the plaintiffs because they had failed to
prove that Baidu had a dominant share of search in China. Id. at 230.
97. See generally Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 32 (evaluating competition between
various types of advertising media).
98. KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“[T]here is no logical basis for distinguishing the Search Ad
Market from the larger market for Internet advertising. Because a website may choose to
advertise via search-based advertising or by posting advertisements independently of any
search, search-based advertising is reasonably interchangeable with other forms of Internet
advertising. The Search Ad Market thus is too narrow to constitute a relevant market.”).
99. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Yahoo! Inc. and Google Inc.
Abandon Their Advertising Agreement (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-981.html. “Internet search advertising” refers to advertisements
that appear on search engines themselves, whereas “internet search syndication” refers to
advertisements that appear on third-party websites through services like Google’s AdSense
program. See id. The DOJ reached its conclusion after evaluating a proposed partnership
between Yahoo! and Google; the parties abandoned the deal after the DOJ announced its
intention to file an antitrust lawsuit to block the agreement. Id.
100. Google/DoubleClick, F.T.C. File No. 071-0170, 7 (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf. The FTC’s analysis arose in the context of Google’s
proposed merger with DoubleClick, a leader in direct buy advertising. Id. at 2. In essence, the
issue was whether the merger of DoubleClick’s direct purchase advertising business with
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“search advertising, ads sold through intermediaries, and directly sold ad
inventory.”101 Focusing primarily on the latter two categories, the FTC concluded
that ads sold through intermediaries (e.g., AdSense) are a separate and distinct
market from directly sold ad inventory (e.g., banner advertisements).102
Intermediary ads tend to be purchased with the intention of causing consumers to
make a purchase on the spot, whereas directly purchased ads are bought for the
purpose of improving brand recognition.103 This distinction, along with evidence
that advertisers did not view the two types of ads as substitutes, led the FTC to
conclude they constitute separate markets.104 The FTC also concluded that
“contextually targeted ads do not constitute a separate market; rather they are part
of a broad market that includes all ads sold by intermediaries” because “the
evidence show[ed] that the prices and quality of contextual ads are constrained by
other forms of display ads sold by ad intermediaries (and vice versa).”105
That a district court, the DOJ, and the FTC all reached very different
conclusions about the relevant market indicates that there is substantial room for
debate about the scope of the market for search advertising. The district court said
all online advertising is included; the DOJ said search engine advertising is its own
market; and the FTC agreed with the DOJ that search engine advertising is its own
market, although the FTC broke with the DOJ when it concluded that Internet
search syndication is part of the larger market for online intermediary
advertisements.
Whether search advertising is its own relevant market is another question for
further empirical research. This Note is directed toward search bias, and therefore
claims directed solely against Google’s alleged search advertising monopoly are
not at issue. What is key is that the DOJ and FTC have concluded that search
advertising is a relevant market and that Google is a dominant player, which
suggests courts will be more likely to find market power in the related market for
horizontal search because of the multi-sided nature of the market.106
Other market definitions will likely be important in any sort of antitrust claim
against Google, but it is impossible to hypothesize all the conceivable markets on
the Internet or those that may spring up overnight. Such considerations will be

Google’s AdSense contextual online advertising service would be anticompetitive. Id. at 1. In a
4-1 decision, the Commission concluded that the merger was unlikely to have anticompetitive
effects. Id.
101. Id. at 7. Without much explanation, the FTC concluded that Google “is the dominant
provider of sponsored search advertising,” indicating that the FTC views Google’s search
engine advertising business as a relevant market and Google’s share at or near the monopoly
level. Id. at 3.
102. Id. at 5–6.
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id. at 5–6.
105. Id.
106. Google’s market power in search advertising will not be analyzed due to space
considerations. The following data may suffice. Google’s share of the search advertising
market was estimated at 75.9% in 2011, up from 69.8% in 2009. Press Release, eMarketer,
Google’s Share of Search Ad Revenues Rises, Unaffected by Bing (June 20, 2011), available
at
http://www.emarketer.com/newsroom/index.php/googles-share-search-ad-revenues-risesunaffected-bing/. Meanwhile, Bing and Yahoo! have gone from a combined share of 20%
down to 15.9% in the same period. Id.
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mentioned when they are relevant in the discussion of anticompetitive conduct
below.
3. Geographic Market
The lack of meaningful geographic borders for Internet-based businesses makes
defining relevant geographic markets for any web-based business interesting but
ultimately simple. In the vast majority of cases, limiting the geographic market to
the United States would be appropriate.107 Unless a particular website is truly local
in nature,108 there would be no basis for narrowing the market to a particular region
of the United States because most websites will compete for the entire U.S. market.
B. Monopoly Power
While the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, the mere possession of
monopoly power is not an offense.109 Monopoly power must be “accompanied by
an element of anticompetitive conduct.”110 A plaintiff must show that the
anticompetitive conduct caused harm “not just to a single competitor, but to the
competitive process, i.e., to competition itself.”111
Monopoly power is defined as “the power to control prices or exclude
competition.”112 To evaluate monopoly power, courts begin with an evaluation of
the firm’s market share in the relevant market.113 The market share a firm must
have to be classified as a monopolist is not precisely defined by the case law, but
70% is a good rule of thumb,114 and to date there have been no cases where a share
of less than 50% was sufficient.115 While some courts are willing to infer market
power from market share alone, others require a showing that the market power is

107. See, e.g., LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV06-6994AHM(RZx), 2007
WL 6865852, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (plaintiff chose the United States as the relevant
geographic market for social networking websites without objection from the defendant
MySpace).
108. One conceivable example would be a plaintiff website that specializes in real estate
listings for Wichita, Kansas. In that case, the plaintiff would not be competing on a
nationwide scale, and hence could realistically hope to limit the market to a small area.
Cases have adopted absurdly narrow geographic market definitions in the past. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey T. Macher & John W. Mayo, Making a Market Out of a Mole Hill? Geographic
Market Definition in Aspen Skiing, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 911, 912 (2010) (noting
that the market definition before the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), was limited to “‘downhill skiing in the Aspen area’”; the
Court ultimately found antitrust liability).
109. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004). Learned Hand famously wrote that “[t]he successful competitor, having been
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.” United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
110. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (emphasis omitted).
111. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).
112. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
113. See, e.g., DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 74, at 21.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 21–22.
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durable.116 The staying power of a monopoly can be shown by demonstrating
barriers to entry such as patent rights,117 government regulations,118 network
effects,119 lock-in/switching costs,120 sunk costs (i.e., high entry costs),121 exclusive
dealing arrangements,122 or insurmountable economies of scale.123 In general, a
barrier to entry can be defined in one of two partially overlapping ways: (1) as a
cost that firms already in the market do not have to pay, or (2) as a market structure
that inherently protects the dominant firm’s market position.124 For purposes of this
analysis, it will be assumed that the horizontal search market is a relevant market.
1. Horizontal Search
Google’s share of the U.S. horizontal search market currently sits on the
boundaries of monopoly levels in the United States. According to the research firm
comScore, Google’s share of the U.S. search market was 66.9% in October 2012,
although other researchers cite figures over 80%.125 The comScore-reported market
share is a mirror match to the 65% market share that Kodak enjoyed when it was
found liable for antitrust violations.126
Assuming that Google has a monopolistic market share (or close to it), the next
question is whether there are barriers to entry that restrain competitors from
entering the horizontal search market. There appear to be two primary barriers to

116. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK
§ 3:4 (2012) (collecting cases); see also Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 696 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding a firm lacked monopoly power
because its “ability to charge monopoly prices will necessarily be temporary”); DOJ,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 74, at 20 (stating that monopoly power must be
“much more than merely fleeting”). Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that monopoly power
should exist for at least five years before it attracts § 2’s attention. PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 319 (2d ed. 2002).
117. CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 30
(2011).
118. Id.
119. See Moffat, supra note 15, at 489.
120. See id. at 494.
121. Alex W. Cannon, Comment, Regulating AdWords: Consumer Protection in a
Market Where the Commodity Is Speech, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 291, 312 (2009).
122. Manne & Wright, supra note 41, at 230.
123. See id. at 210. For example, “natural monopolies” like electric utilities, have been
considered to be inherently immune to normal competitive pressures. See generally id. at
211–12; see also Alabama Power Co. v. F.C.C., 311 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2002)
(discussing electric utilities as an example of a natural monopoly).
124. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
125. Compare Press Release, comScore, comScore Releases October 2012 U.S. Search
Engine Rankings (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press
_Releases/2012/11/comScore_Releases_October_2012_U.S._Search_Engine_Rankings, with
StatCounter Global Stats, STATCOUNTER, available at http://gs.statcounter.com/#search_
engine-US-monthly-201209-201211-bar.
126. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir.
1997) (finding that Kodak controlled 65% “of the markets for photocopier and micrographic
equipment parts”).
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entry in horizontal search: network effects and sunk costs. These barriers are
counterbalanced by the near-zero switching costs in the market for search.
The most commonly asserted reason for Google’s dominance is indirect network
effects.127 The argument goes something like this: When users search on Google,
they provide Google with user data that Google can then utilize to improve its
search algorithm, thus improving its appeal to consumers; this sequence then
repeats itself, creating a feedback loop.128 Further, because Google is able to attract
users with its superior search results, it is then able to attract more advertising
dollars.129 These advertising dollars fund Google’s continuing efforts to improve its
search product in a cycle that makes it impossible for rivals to catch up.130
Argenton and Prüfer have argued that user query logs make monopolization of
search inevitable.131 User query logs record the user’s behavior on the search
results page.132 If a user clicks on a link that is not prominently displayed on the
results, or enters new search terms, it indicates that the results offered by the engine
were suboptimal.133 The algorithm can then adapt, or be modified, to produce better
results.134 Because competitors cannot match the dominant search engine’s ability
to improve its results using query logs, the dominant search engine’s quality gap
over its competitors continues to increase over time, leading to further
dominance.135 Thus, the natural trend in search is toward an oligopoly of the search
engines with sufficient user bases and funding, and the trend ultimately leads to one
very dominant engine.136
The search query log argument is not without dispute. Though lacking empirical
data, Manne and Wright argue that the minimum scale necessary to effectively
maintain a search algorithm is readily achievable, and that beyond this minimum
scale the returns from query logs diminish.137 They argue that search engines like
Bing and Yahoo! already have sufficient scale and therefore are not at a
competitive disadvantage.138
This assertion is dubious in light of the DOJ’s investigation of a proposed deal
between Bing and Yahoo!, in which the DOJ concluded that by combining their
user query logs the parties would be able to provide more effective search
results.139 Manne and Wright’s assertion is also dubious because one-sixth of the

127. See, e.g., Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine Competition with Network
Externalities 1 (Tilburg L. & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper 2011-024, 2011).
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 9.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id. at 2.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id. at 9, 11.
137. Manne & Wright, supra note 41, at 212 (“Based on conversations we have had with
industry insiders, it appears that algorithmic results are only weakly affected by the number
of end users or searches.”).
138. Id. at 224.
139. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid
Search Advertising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc. (Feb. 18,
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queries received by Google are new,140 indicating that query logs may play a
significant role in constantly updating the algorithm, particularly with regard to
searches for new, rare, and/or obscure terms. In any case, it is true that the
relationship between user query logs and search engine dominance is unclear to
academia at this time.141
It is worth noting that the query logs are perhaps the only barrier to entry in
search with a close analog in the Microsoft case. In Microsoft, it was found that the
popularity of Windows encouraged software developers to write applications for
Windows’ broad audience over less popular operating systems.142 And, because
consumers wanted an operating system with many applications, a feedback loop
helped to ensure that Windows would remain dominant.143 Query logs may serve a
similar function: if query logs substantially affect search result quality, then a nondominant search engine would not be able to match the dominant search engine’s
ability to improve its algorithm simply because the dominant search engine has a
larger audience.
Sunk costs in the form of infrastructure investment and initial product
development represent another barrier to entry in search. Running a search engine
requires a large investment in the infrastructure necessary to crawl pages, index
them, and process queries. Crawling the web to index content, when content is
expanding rapidly, is an enormous task. In 2008, Google had mapped one trillion
unique URLs, with several billion more pages being added daily.144 Google
processes this mass of information several times a day.145 The company calls it “the
computational equivalent of fully exploring every intersection of every road in the
United States. Except [it would] be a map about 50,000 times as big as the U.S.,
with 50,000 times as many roads and intersections.”146 While a new entrant need
not have the same resources as Google to compete, the initial investment is
nonetheless significant.
The cost of developing a search algorithm is also substantial. Search algorithms
are closely guarded secrets and in some cases, such as PageRank, key
developments are patented and unavailable for licensing.147 As such, a successful
competing search algorithm could take years to develop from scratch and bring to
market.148 And where novel features of a search engine are not protected by
2010) (“The transaction will enhance Microsoft’s competitive performance because it will
have access to a larger set of queries, which should accelerate the automated learning of
Microsoft's search and paid search algorithms and enhance Microsoft's ability to serve more
relevant search results and paid search listings, particularly with respect to rare or ‘tail’
queries.” (emphasis added)).
140. Matt Warman, Google, Caffeine and the Future of Search, TELEGRAPH (June 17,
2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/7833590/Google-Caffeineand-the-future-of-search.html.
141. See Manne & Wright, supra note 41, at 224–27.
142. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
143. Id.
144. Jesse Alpert & Nissan Hajaj, We Knew the Web Was Big..., OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG
(July 25, 2008), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-big.html.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 27.
148. One estimate is that search engine code is about three million lines long and would
cost up to $100 million dollars to develop. See Rufus Pollock, Is Google the Next Microsoft?
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intellectual property, a dominant search engine may simply copy those features to
neutralize innovative competitors.149
Because the present search model is dependent on advertising dollars, no
competing search engine is likely to be able to recover its sunk costs without first
achieving a sufficient user base to attract large advertising revenues. Nor can an
entrant steal away users by undercutting prices, because search engine services are
offered for free. This means that market entry is both costly and risky. But two
countervailing considerations lead to the conclusion that these barriers to entry do
not insulate a dominant search engine from competitive pressures.
The first countervailing consideration is switching costs. Users can, and do,
switch between search engines simply by typing in a URL.150 Admittedly, some
switching costs do exist. For example, users may be accustomed to optimizing their
search terms for a search engine’s algorithm, or the search engine may have learned
to personalize its search results to the user based on the user’s search history. But
these switching costs are markedly different from those present in cases such as
Microsoft. In that case, switching would have required users to buy a new operating
system, and possibly a new computer, in addition to losing their investment on any
software that was incompatible with the new operating system.151
The second countervailing consideration is the present and past state of the
search engine market. Yahoo!, once the dominant search engine, was itself
displaced by the disruptive entry of Google into the market.152 That is an indication
of the dynamic nature of the search market. The recent entry of other competitors
into the market also indicates that while sunk costs are substantial, competitors are
willing to risk entry. Since 2008, Bing, Blekko, and DuckDuckGo have all
launched search engines that compete directly with Google.153 At the time of
writing, comScore’s most recent market share report states that Google’s
competitors share a third of the market, with Bing-powered search accounting for
the lion’s share.154

Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Internet Search 26 n.45 (Emmanuel Coll. & Faculty
of Econs., Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 0921, 2009), available at http://
econpapers.repec.org/paper/camcamdae/0921.htm.
149. “‘If it is really attractive, I fully expect Google to just add the technology or copy
it.’” Catherine Holahan, A Gaggle of Google Wannabes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct.
4, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2006/tc20061004_441574.
htm (quoting analyst Youssef Squali).
150. See ROBERT H. BORK & J. GREGORY SIDAK, WHAT DOES THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
TEACH ABOUT INTERNET SEARCH AND THE ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF GOOGLE? 8 (American
Enterprise Institute) (2012).
151. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
152. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1182 (2008).
153. Bing.com Official Launch Date, BING WATCH . . . JUST BING IT! (June 3, 2009
12:08 AM), http://www.bingwatch.com/bing-watch/2009/06/bingcom-official-launch-date.html;
Michael Arrington, Get Ready for Blekko: Public Launch on November 1, TECHCRUNCH (Oct.
26, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/10/26/get-ready-for-blekko-public-launch-on-november1; Miranda Miller, Happy Birthday, DuckDuckGo: Homegrown Search Engine Turns 4, SEARCH
ENGINE WATCH (Sept. 26, 2012), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2208454/HappyBirthday-DuckDuckGo-Homegrown-Search-Engine-Turns-4.
154. See supra note 125.
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The evidence of successful market entry, combined with near-zero switching
costs, suggests that a court would be, and should be, hesitant to conclude that a
dominant search engine can maintain its market share by means other than winning
on the competitive merits.
2. What’s the Harm?
Even if a court were to conclude that search dominance is protected by barriers
to entry, there is a fundamental problem with the conclusion that Google has
monopoly power: how can Google exclude competition or raise prices in a market
where users receive the product for free, and where users can switch services by
simply typing in another URL?
Google cannot directly exclude competitors from entering the search engine
market because it has no ability to stop a competitor from going online. Upstart
search engines like Blekko and Bing have been able to quickly attract new users,
which suggests that breaking into the search engine market is possible, although
Blekko is suffering from a lack of resources and Bing is sustaining huge financial
losses.155 Nor can Google prevent other websites, such as its antagonist Foundem,
from going online and being discovered through competing search engines, social
media, or traditional advertising.
It is also unlikely that Google could begin charging consumers to use its search
service without suffering an immediate, catastrophic loss of users. It is conceivable
that, as a dominant player in search, Google could raise advertising prices
profitably, thereby causing indirect harm to consumers in the form of increased
prices, without suffering a corresponding loss of its user base. As discussed above,
increased advertising prices would likely have no discernible effect on Google’s
consumer base because the increased costs on consumers would be so indirect as to
be an externality. Whether a dominant search engine is capable of extracting
monopoly advertising rents would be an empirical question that is complicated by
the fact that, in Google’s case, advertising prices is auction based. This means that,
to a large extent, the market is choosing what to pay for AdWords advertising.
Further, alternative advertising venues, including those of competing search
engines, may discipline prices.
Another related problem is whether a dominant search engine would have any
incentive to compromise the quality of its search results by engaging in search bias.
In a recent article, Robert Bork and Gregory Sidak argue against there being any
rational, anticompetitive reason for a dominant search engine to manipulate search
results.156 Bork and Sidak point out that Google’s competitors, like Bing and

155. See David Angotti, $30 Million in Funding for Blekko: Blekko Has More Cash to
Slash the Web, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.searchengine
journal.com/yandex-funds-blekko/34233/ (reporting that Blekko primarily runs off of the
$54 million in venture capital it has secured since its 2007 launch); David Goldman,
Microsoft’s Plan to Stop Bing’s $1 Billion Bleeding, CNN MONEY (Sept. 20, 2011, 12:41
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/20/technology/microsoft_bing/index.htm (reporting that
Bing is hemorrhaging one billion dollars per quarter, and has lost $5.5 billion since its June
2009 launch).
156. BORK & SIDAK, supra note 150, at 10–12.
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Yahoo!, provide specialized search results akin to what one sees on Google—such
as maps displayed in response to queries for addresses.157 If consumers disliked this
functionality, a competing search engine could snatch up market share by removing
it. As users departed from Google, advertisers would follow them.158 Thus, keeping
this functionality in place would be contrary to Google’s self-interest were it not
something consumers prefer. Bork and Sidak also point out that under the singlemonopoly-profit theorem, it would likely be irrational for a dominant search engine
to drive away users with an inferior product in an effort to gain market share in
other markets.159 Indeed, if a search engine were to harm its product for the sake of
anticompetitive bias, it would be a strong indication that the search engine is a
monopoly and is not under competitive pressures.160
The above problems aside, the rest of the analysis will assume that Google has
monopoly power in the appropriate relevant markets. In light of Google’s inability
to exclude competing search engines and its questionable ability to extract
monopoly prices for its advertising, it is unclear how Google can do anything more
than hamstring downstream websites by failing to rank them highly. Outside a
smoking gun case of attempted monopolization, there appear to be only two legal
theories of anticompetitive conduct that could convert such “hamstringing” into a
Sherman Act claim. These will now be examined.
A. Anticompetitive Conduct
The most prominent theories of anticompetitive conduct premised on search bias
are the essential facilities doctrine and the monopoly leveraging doctrine. As will
be shown below, these theories are likely to fail. Additionally, research has
indicated that Google’s competitors engage in search bias.161 As a general
proposition, when all competitors in a market engage in a business practice it
indicates that the practice is not anticompetitive.162
1. Essential Facilities Doctrine
One line of argument would be that Google’s search engine is an “essential
facility,” and that removing a competitor from search results (or demoting the
competitor so far as to effectively remove him) makes it impossible to compete.
The essential facilities doctrine is a method of proving the predatory acts necessary

157. Id. at 12.
158. Id. at 5.
159. Id. at 10.
160. Behavior that is only rational where a party is, or expects to become, a monopolist is
itself evidence that the party is a monopolist. See Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that predatory pricing behavior
is only rational if a firm expects to gain or preserve monopoly powers as a result).
161. See WRIGHT supra note 58.
162. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 227 (D.C. Cir.
1986); see also FTC Google Statement, supra note 11, at 2 (noting that Google’s competitors
engaged in practices similar to those of Google, which indicated to the FTC that those
practices were not anticompetitive).

2013]

gMONOPOLY

1579

to show a § 2 violation.163 The basic premise is that where a facility is essential to
compete, and a monopolist or near monopolist is in control of the facility, it is
illegal anticompetitive conduct for the monopolist to deny his competitors access to
the facility. The doctrine has its roots in the context of railroads. A group of
railroads combined to control three terminals that constituted all railway bridges
and switching yards leading into and out of St. Louis, effectively precluding any
competing railroads from offering service to, or even through, St. Louis.164 The
Supreme Court ruled that the colluding railroads had to grant access to the
terminals or the Court would enjoin the defendants from operating the terminals
collectively.165
The Seventh Circuit has articulated four elements for proving an essential
facilities case: “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility;
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of
providing the facility.”166
A plaintiff complaining of demotion or banishment from Google’s search results
could probably succeed on the last three prongs. Competitors cannot feasibly
recreate Google (element two). In an appropriate case, a competitor could allege
that it was kicked off Google for anticompetitive reasons (element three). Google
can list competitors at near-zero cost (element four). But proving that Google is
essential would be difficult, if not impossible.
Under the more liberal reading of the essential facilities doctrine, which requires
only a “severe handicap on potential market entrants,”167 the claim is cognizable.
TripAdvisor, for example, receives 29.48% of its traffic from Google.168 However,
the cases generally hold that where unilateral conduct is involved, control over
access to the facility must grant the ability to eliminate competition.169 Websites
that are excluded by Google may still be ranked highly by competing search
engines like Bing and Yahoo!. Websites can also promote themselves by
purchasing advertising or by being linked to from other websites. Moreover, the
story of Foundem illustrates that Google does not eliminate competitors. In spite of
Google having a market share of more than 90% in Europe, Foundem (which
operates in Europe) was still alive and kicking after being de facto banished from

163. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 116, § 3:13.
164. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 401 (1912).
165. Id. at 412–13.
166. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir.
1983).
167. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
168. Dennis Schaal, TripAdvisor Upstream Traffic—Google Sharply Down, Facebook
Rising, TNOOZ (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.tnooz.com/2011/01/28/news/tripadvisorupstream-traffic-google-sharply-down-facebook-rising.
169. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991)
(collecting cases and holding that “[a] facility that is controlled by a single firm will be
considered ‘essential’ only if control of the facility carries with it the power to eliminate
competition in the downstream market” (emphasis in original)).
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Google for three years.170 A district court has already ruled that Google is not an
essential facility using similar reasoning.171
The Supreme Court has also thrown a wet blanket on the essential facilities
doctrine. In Trinko, Justice Scalia wrote that the essential facilities doctrine was
“crafted by some lower courts” and that the Court had “never recognized such a
doctrine.”172 The Court noted that Terminal Railroad involved a group of
competitors colluding, and hence the doctrine had not been approved by the Court
in cases of unilateral action.173 The Trinko Court declined to rule definitively on the
validity of the doctrine.174
2. Monopoly Leveraging
Monopoly leveraging occurs when a monopolist uses its monopoly power in one
market to gain a competitive advantage in another market. The doctrine is currently
on life support, although it has not been expressly abandoned. The Second Circuit
originally had the most liberal test for monopoly leveraging, requiring “monopoly
power in one market, ‘the use of [that] power, however lawfully acquired, to
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor’
in another distinct market, and injury caused by the challenged conduct.”175 The
Second Circuit later hemmed in the doctrine by stating that “monopoly leveraging
claims should be limited to instances where the challenged conduct ‘threatens the
[second] market with the higher prices or reduced output or quality associated with
the kind of monopoly that is ordinarily accompanied by a large market share.’”176
In Alaska Airlines, the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected the monopoly leveraging
doctrine, and held that on such facts a plaintiff must prove a traditional attempted
monopolization claim.177 The Third and Seventh Circuits have since agreed that
monopoly leveraging is not an independent offense.178 The Supreme Court seemed
to favor the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Trinko, although its treatment of the
doctrine was limited to a footnote.179 The Court’s wording suggests that the Second

170. Foundem’s Google Story, supra note 10.
171. KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2006 WL 3246596, at
*9 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (holding that Google was not an essential facility because
KinderStart, which saw its traffic drop 70% after Google demoted its search rankings, was
still able to generate sufficient traffic to remain afloat; hence competition was not
“eliminated”).
172. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410–11 (2004).
173. Id. at 410 n.3.
174. Id. at 410.
175. Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citation omitted).
176. AD/SAT, A Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 232 (2d Cir.
1999) (citation omitted).
177. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547–49. (9th Cir. 1991).
178. See Schor v. Abbott Labs., 457 F.3d 608, 611–13 (7th Cir. 2006); Fineman v.
Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 204–06 (3d Cir. 1992).
179. “To the extent the Court of Appeals dispensed with a requirement that there be a
‘dangerous probability of success’ in monopolizing a second market, it erred. In any event,
leveraging presupposes anticompetitive conduct, which in this case could only be the
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Circuit’s test is inadequate without the additional element of a dangerous
probability of successful monopolization, but the Court did not rule that monopoly
leveraging is an invalid § 2 theory. For example, the Court’s comment leaves open
the possibility that a showing of specific intent might be unnecessary in a
monopoly leveraging claim.180
Google’s conduct would appear to fit neatly within a monopoly leveraging
theory. By removing competitors from its search results and promoting its own
products, Google is able to leverage its search engine power to gain a competitive
advantage in other markets.

Figure 1: Google Product Search U.S. Traffic Before and After Universal
Search181
In December 2007, when Google began giving Google Product Search
preference with Universal Search, the effect was immediate, as Figure 1 illustrates.
The increase in traffic was met with a corresponding loss of traffic to competing
price comparison websites, and the effect was even greater in the United Kingdom,
where Google enjoys a larger share of the search market.182
refusal-to-deal claim we have rejected.” Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n.4 (2004) (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506
U.S. 447, 459 (1993)).
180. Before Trinko, the Second Circuit also recognized that Spectrum Sports may have
abolished the monopoly leveraging doctrine when the Supreme Court wrote that § 2 “‘makes
the conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously
threatens to do so.’” AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 230 (quoting Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459)
(emphasis added). Note that the Second Circuit cited to the same portion of Spectrum Sports
that Justice Scalia later cited to in Trinko.
181. CONSUMER WATCHDOG, supra note 54, at 11.
182. See RAFF & RAFF, supra note 62.
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Under the liberal standard of monopoly leveraging, such behavior might be
enough for a plaintiff to succeed. However, as shown above, the case law now
questions the validity of the doctrine, and it is likely that a plaintiff would need to
rely on a traditional attempted monopolization theory to prove an antitrust claim in
a market that Google has not monopolized.
Attempted monopolization carries with it the difficulty of proving intent, as well
as defining other relevant markets and proving a dangerous probability of
success.183 And again, vertical search services are almost universally offered for
free. Hence, if a free service cannot be a relevant market, then there could be no
attempted monopolization claim for such a market.
3. A Comment on Predatory Algorithm Changes
Since it is very difficult even for experts to evaluate search engines,
search engine bias is particularly insidious. . . . For example, a search
engine could add a small factor to search results from “friendly”
companies, and subtract a factor from results from competitors. This
type of bias is very difficult to detect but could still have a significant
effect on the market.
–Sergey Brin and Larry Page, Google Co-Founders184
As the above quote from the men who created Google suggests, search engine
bias can be very subtle and difficult to detect, 185 and the current state of antitrust
law would make any claim based on algorithm manipulation very difficult. As a
general matter, courts are very wary of ruling on the merits of a company’s product
development choices.186 The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a design change that
improves a product will, as a practical matter, insulate a company from § 2
liability.187

183. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456 (holding that attempted monopolization requires
“(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a
specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
power”). “[W]hereas [a monopolization claim] . . . generally requires the defendant to have a
market share around 75 percent or higher, plaintiffs can satisfy the dangerous probability
element for attempted monopolization by showing that the defendant has a market share of
around 35 percent or higher, depending on the presence of barriers to entry.” LESLIE, supra
note 117, at 32.
184. Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web
Search Engine, STANFORD UNIV., http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html.
185. See, e.g., Charles Arthur, How Google’s ‘Panda’ Update Put Some Websites on
Endangered Species List, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2011, 11:24 AM), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/technology/2011/dec/05/google-panda-update-endangered-species.
186. “As a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition
has been harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.” United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit has similarly warned against any
liability standard that “would enmesh the courts in a technical inquiry into the justifiability
of product innovations.” Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d
1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976).
187. “There is no violation of Section 2 unless [a] plaintiff proves that some conduct of
the monopolist associated with its introduction of a new and improved product design
‘constitutes an anticompetitive abuse or leverage of monopoly power, or a predatory or
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For example, in Microsoft, it was found that Microsoft had integrated the code
for Internet Explorer into critical Windows code, making it virtually impossible to
remove Internet Explorer from Windows.188 Microsoft had also taken Internet
Explorer off of the “add/remove” menu, meaning that users could not delete the
program.189 Because Microsoft offered no procompetitive justification for the
design changes, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that Microsoft
had made the design changes for the sole purpose of preserving its monopoly in the
operating system market.190
Thus, any claim that Google alters its algorithm in anticompetitive ways could
be rebutted by Google demonstrating that the design change was a product
improvement, and courts would tend to give Google the benefit of the doubt.
Google could offer procompetitive justifications by, for example, showing that the
design changes improved performance, lowered costs, increased the relevancy of
search results, or improved the appeal of Google’s product in general.191 In fact,
this occurred in the FTC’s own investigation of Google’s alleged search bias. The
FTC noted that Google’s “bias” could be justified as permissible product design
choices.192 The FTC also emphasized its reticence to “second-guess a firm’s
product design decisions where plausible procompetitive justifications have been
offered, and where those justifications are supported by ample evidence.”193 A
defense based on product design would not be available if it could be shown that
Google simply altered its algorithm to quash competition, but at present those facts
are not in evidence.194
C. If There Is a Wrong, What’s the Remedy?
Assuming that an antitrust claim could be proved against a dominant search
engine, there remains the burning question of what remedy could be imposed—
several potential remedies have been suggested by Google’s critics.195 A recent
article by Marvin Ammori and Luke Pelican summarizes and criticizes each, but
this Note will focus on only one: search neutrality.196 The rest of the proposed
exclusionary means of attempting to monopolize the market.’” Allied Orthopedic
Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 545–46 (9th Cir. 1983)).
188. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 64–65.
189. Id. at 64.
190. Id. at 66–67.
191. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“IBM, assuming it was a monopolist, had the right to redesign its products to make them
more attractive to buyers—whether by reason of lower manufacturing cost and price or
improved performance. It was under no duty to help CalComp or other peripheral equipment
manufacturers survive or expand.”).
192. FTC Google Statement, supra note 11, at 2.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Similar to the Microsoft case, intentional manipulation of search results to harm
competitors, with no procompetitive justification whatsoever, may be the most persuasive
fact pattern for an antitrust case. See Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality as an Antitrust
Principle, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1199 (2012) (outlining an antitrust doctrine that would
prohibit search bias if no procompetitive justification for the bias exists).
195. See generally Ammori & Pelican, supra note 7.
196. See id. at 13–17 (discussing and dismissing the possibility of a “search neutrality”
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remedies, such as divesture and regulation of search results page formatting, are
deeply problematic and should not be pursued.
Ammori and Pelican make the argument that imposing search neutrality via
judicial or regulatory means is impossible because “no one has articulated a
specific formula or metric for determining when or if Google's display opinions
improperly disadvantage rivals.”197 Other scholars have similarly argued that search
neutrality is a nonstarter because search results are inherently subjective
opinions.198 This argument goes too far because there is a simple, four-element
formula for defining improper search bias. Search bias occurs when (1) a search
engine manipulates its search results rankings (2) based on the search engine’s
pecuniary interests in those results (3) without disclosing it is doing so (4) while
claiming to be providing search results that are based on an unbiased, objective
measure of relevance. It is easy to define search bias because search bias has
nothing to do with any reasonable, objective measure of relevance—it has to do
with the search engine’s proprietary interests. Nor would detecting such bias be
difficult in all cases. Search engine results are short and most users never look past
the first page.199 Accordingly, bias is likely to be concentrated in the first few
results and in areas with the greatest commercial significance—where the
incentives for bias are greatest. Thus, potential bias is obvious where certain
websites owned or affiliated with the dominant search engine consistently appear
near the top of the results, or where competing websites appear lower on the
dominant engine’s results than on competing search engines, for no apparent
reason.
But while search bias can be defined, Ammori and Pelican make several
separate and compelling arguments about the difficulty of enforcing an antitrust
decree against search bias. First, positively identifying search bias would likely
require extensive technical expertise in the computer sciences, and significant time
and expense might be wasted by monitoring compliance with an outside committee
of technical experts. A technical committee was implemented in the Microsoft case
and it has been subjected to much criticism.200 However, concerns about the
technical difficulty of identifying bias in source code are not without opposing
considerations. Because each build of a search algorithm would contain largely the
same source code, the resources required to isolate newly introduced, bias-inducing
code could be substantially reduced by ignoring the code that remains unchanged
from prior iterations.
remedy).
197. Id. at 13.
198. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Revisiting Search Engine Bias, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
96, 107 (2011) (“[T]he term ‘search neutrality’ implies the existence of neutral search
engines, but those are entirely mythical.”); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If
Search Neutrality Is the Answer, What’s the Question?, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 151, 162.
199. One study showed that 68% of users view only the first page of search results, 92%
never view more than three pages of search results, and 39% of users believe websites that
frequently appear high on search engine results are leaders in their field. Nate Rodnay, 92% of
Search Engine Users View First Three Pages of Search Results, BUS. HIGHLIGHT,
http://www.businesshighlight.org/computers-and-internet/internet/92-of-search-engine-usersview-first-three-pages-of-search-results.html.
200. See Ammori & Pelican, supra note 7, at 15–17 (citing various criticisms of the
Microsoft technical committee).
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Second, monitoring a decree is likely to be very difficult for a generalist judge
because of the technical matter involved.201 Likewise, the FTC is not focused on
these sorts of highly technical issues, though presumably the agency would be
better able to retain a technical staff than a court.
Third, a decree might encourage competitors to make endless, largely baseless
claims of search bias each time their rankings drop or Google’s rise.202 This would
be a resource drain on the court and Google, and it could function as an
anticompetitive weapon.
Fourth, and perhaps most persuasively, search rankings could repeatedly change
in the course of an enforcement proceeding, making an accurate and speedy
adjudication of all but the most severe instances of search bias impractical or
impossible as subsequent changes moot alleged harms.203
D. Takeaways
From the above discussion, a few conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the
low switching costs associated with free online services may, as a practical matter,
insulate the providers of those services from antitrust liability. Low switching costs
mean that online businesses are always under a competitive threat from new
entrants. This is not necessarily an undesirable outcome. Indeed, it would be far
more undesirable to hold a company liable under the Sherman Act when the
company has merely succeeded in a highly competitive marketplace.
The second conclusion to be drawn is that current antitrust doctrine tends to
disfavor the legal theories that would be argued against a dominant search engine
on the basis of search bias. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the FTC chose to
close its search bias investigation and forego an antitrust case. But given the
interest the FTC has shown in pursuing its enforcement agenda recently,204 it is
probable the FTC will pursue a regulatory agenda where antitrust fails.
III. REGULATING SEARCH
For years a debate has raged about regulating search.205 Solutions range from a
free market approach, to a common law of search, to creating a Federal Search
Commission.206 This Part briefly examines these proposals and offers its own
regulatory proposal based on prior regulations and certain existing FTC
guidelines.207

201. Id. at 12.
202. Id. at 14.
203. Id. at 14–15.
204. See, e.g., Kevin E. Noonan, FTC Asks Supreme Court to Play Favorites in Reverse
Payment Settlement Agreement Cases, PATENT DOCS (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.patent
docs.org/2012/10/ftc-asks-supreme-court-to-play-favorites-in-reverse-payment-settlementagreement-cases.html (discussing three separate tests cases brought by the FTC in an attempt to
have Hatch-Watchman Act “reverse payments” declared illegal under competition law).
205. See Moffat, supra note 15 (tracing the debate over search engine regulation).
206. Id. at 477.
207. Benjamin Edelman and Benjamin Lockwood appear to have been the first scholars
to analogize airline Computer Reservation Systems to search engines. See Benjamin
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A. Proposals to Regulate Search Bias
Professor Viva Moffat encapsulates the present debate over regulating search
nicely. At one end is the atomic bomb solution of a Federal Search Commission.208
This line of reasoning likens search engines to telecom giants and railroads, which
are important industries that exhibit network effects tending toward monopoly.209
Therefore, proponents conclude, regulation is justified.210 But a special agency
regulating search engines is unnecessary and unwise. Regulatory agencies tend to
create burdensome, politicized rules and are subject to capture.211 In an innovative
and fast-moving market like search, such an agency is more likely to stifle
innovation, to lock in suboptimal technologies, and to favor entrenched interests
than it is to provide a net benefit to society.212 The Federal Search Commission
solution smacks of the nirvana fallacy, wherein government regulation cures all ills
and produces none of its own.213
The intermediate common law approach to search engine law advocated by
Professor Moffat214 is likely to be hopelessly unprepared to deal with rapid
technological advances and unforeseen product development. Indeed, the market
for search may be so different in a few years that we would no longer think of
regulating search engines as they are today.215 One can imagine judges struggling
to apply the doctrine of stare decisis as the facts on the ground quickly undermine
the rationale of binding precedents.216
The free market approach postulates that users and advertisers will discipline
search engines, thus obviating the need for government intervention.217 For
example, bad publicity from documented search engine bad acting could cause
users and advertisers to depart en masse.218 The problem with this approach is that,
as Google’s founders recognized, search engine misconduct is hard to discover.
Further, a failure to act in the present could lead to more burdensome regulation in
the future, like the Federal Search Commission, particularly if truly ghastly stories
of search engine bad acting were to grab widespread headlines. Finally, there is no
Edelman & Benjamin Lockwood, Measuring Bias in “Organic” Web Search,
BENEDELMAN.ORG (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias.
208. Moffat, supra note 15, at 488.
209. See id. at 489.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 492.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion,
94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1898 (2006) (“Furthermore, any proposed regulatory solution must take
care to avoid the classic nirvana fallacy: Just because a market-based outcome is suboptimal
does not mean that a government-imposed outcome will necessarily fare any better.”).
214. Moffat, supra note 15, at 499.
215. See Robert W. Crandall & Charles L. Jackson, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries, 38
REV. INDUS. ORG. 319, 324–330 (2011) (recounting cases where DOJ antitrust enforcement
was preempted by evolving technology).
216. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
854–55 (1992) (“[When applying stare decisis,] we may ask . . . whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.”).
217. Moffat, supra note 15, at 490.
218. Id. at 491.
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such thing as an unregulated market in the United States because antitrust laws
apply universally.219 The lasseiz-faire approach is, in pragmatic terms, really an
argument for relying on antitrust enforcement.
A fourth approach to search bias regulation, raised after Professor Moffat’s
article, has also received attention and criticism. Benjamin Edelman and Benjamin
Lockwood have argued for a regulation of search modeled on the regulation of
airline Computer Reservation Systems (CRSs).220
In the 1980s, the DOJ conducted an investigation into the practices of CRSs,
resulting in a variety of agency regulations.221 CRSs provided contracting travel
agencies with flight information transmitted by carriers via computer networks.222
Flights would show up on a computer screen as a list of results, much the same way
that we see search results today, and travel agents could choose a flight from the
listings and book it electronically.223 The major CRSs were all owned by large
airlines, with American’s SABRE and United’s Apollo being the leaders.224 The
claims of anticompetitive conduct brought by the DOJ after its investigation
resemble those levied against Google today.
Apollo and SABRE were found to have systematically biased their CRS results
in favor of their owner-airlines’ flights.225 For example, their algorithms heavily
weighted factors that were carrier-specific.226 Other examples include inflating the
flight times of competitors and blocking flights with lower fares.227 CRSs were also
found to have updated competitors’ flight information at a slower rate.228 This
practice harmed competition by making competitors’ flight information less
reliable, by allowing owner-airlines to respond to market prices more effectively,
and by giving the owner-airlines a temporary window where only their flights
would appear on the screen.229 A search engine could behave similarly by crawling
and indexing disfavored websites less frequently. If it did so, those websites would

219. Cindy R. Alexander & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Economics of Regulatory Reform:
Termination of Airline Computer Reservation System Rules, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 426
(2004) (“[T]he word ‘deregulation’ is a misnomer: the correct characterization is whether the
market ‘should be “regulated by the agency” or “regulated by the antitrust laws.”’”).
220. See Benjamin Edelman, Bias in Search Results?: Diagnosis and Response, 7 Indian
J. L. & Tech. 16 (2011); Edelman & Lockwood, supra note 207.
221. Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert, Vertical Integration as a Threat to Competition: Airline
Computer Reservation Systems, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS
432, 434 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 2d ed. 1992).
222. Id. at 436.
223. Id. at 436–37.
224. Id. at 443. The creation of CRSs is truly a story of capitalism in action. An IBM
salesman, sitting next to an airline executive on a flight, listened to the executive’s
complaints about the logistical deficiencies of ticketing practices. Timothy M. Ravich,
Deregulation of the Airline Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) Industry, 69 J. AIR L. &
COM. 387, 390 (2004). In a carpe diem moment, the IBM salesman made his pitch. Id. Soon
after, IBM engineers were hard at work applying Cold War computer technology developed
for the military to the problem of air travel reservations. Id.
225. Guerin-Calvert, supra note 221, at 446.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Alexander & Lee, supra note 219, at 380.
229. Guerin-Calvert, supra note 221, at 447.
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experience a substantial delay before they would appear on the search results. This
should lead to a feedback effect that further advantages the favored websites.
Because the favored websites would appear on Google first, people would be more
likely to discover and link to them. And because PageRank favors sites that receive
lots of links from other websites, the effect would be self-reinforcing. Websites that
appear first would be more likely to continue to appear first.
The history of CRS regulation is both an instructive and cautionary tale. In a
comprehensive post-mortem of CRS regulations, which were repealed in 2004,230
Alexander and Lee demonstrate that the goals of CRS regulation were never fully
achieved, and that repeal was eminently justified.231 They also demonstrate that
regulation had untoward effects. The agencies intruded excessively into the CRS
market, which likely hampered innovation.232 Contract terms, the structure of
display screens, and even algorithmic weighting were regulated by rule.233 None of
this intrusion was necessary to prevent the primary problem: preventing CRS
displays from being systematically biased in favor of its owner-airline.234 Instead of
focusing regulatory efforts on this bias, the agencies became obsessed with drawing
new entrants into the CRS market—something that never happened.
Aside from the problematic history of CRS regulations, there are practical
reasons why the regulations do not apply cleanly to search engines. CRS rankings
involve relatively few variables, a small number of parties, and a steady number of
flights based on existing routes.235 This small amount of data makes sifting through
code and discovering illicit bias a very realistic goal. By contrast, search algorithms

230. The voluntary divesture of all airline ownership in CRSs, combined with the advent
of competition from internet flight booking services like Orbitz, ultimately led to a repeal of
all CRS rules. Alexander & Lee, supra note 219, at 398, 405. The sudden lack of ownerairline self-interest and the influx of new competition led the agencies to conclude that
regulation was no longer necessary. Id. Enforcement would now be accomplished on a caseby-case basis via antitrust law. Id. at 424. Interestingly, all but one CRS initially supported
applying CRS rules to travel websites. Id. at 390. It was only after the agencies refused to do
so that the CRSs unanimously favored repeal. Id. The CRS preference for regulating other
industries, as opposed to deregulating the CRS industry itself, suggests that the CRS
regulations may have actually benefited the interests of entrenched CRSs at that time. See id.
at 429 (positing this theory).
231. Id. at 371–75.
232. In fact, innovation was almost certainly hampered by the government’s approach to
CRSs. Richard Ferris, a United Airlines executive, presaged the modern travel reservation
process with his plan to use CRSs to reserve not only flights, but hotels and rental cars as
well. Fred L. Smith, Jr., The Case for Reforming the Antitrust Regulations (If Repeal Is Not
an Option), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 35 (1999). Ferris’s vision of an integrated
system of travel reservation, which today provides tremendous benefits to consumers, was
met with brutal hostility during a Senate hearing. Id. Ferris resigned soon after and his plan
was abandoned. Id.
233. Alexander & Lee, supra note 219, at 386–88 (listing CRS rules).
234. One would presume that the competitor airlines’ own self-interest would motivate
them to monitor CRSs for perceived bias and to bring any perceived bias to the attention of
enforcement authorities. The antitrust lawsuits competitors quickly filed against American
and United support this conclusion. Id. at 379. Those in the best position to discover bias
were the competitors. Proscribing a series of micromanaging rules designed to prevent bias
thus did little to facilitate enforcement of the general prohibition on bias.
235. Ammori & Pelican, supra note 7, at 15.
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continuously seek out and organize billions of web pages, are constantly updated,
and are of far greater complexity than the ranking systems a CRS probably
employed. In spite of the problems associated with CRS regulation, one aspect of
CRS regulation may be the best solution to the general harms caused by search
bias.
B. A Broader Solution—Thinking of Undisclosed Bias As a Deceptive Practice
Thus far, the discussion has focused on dominant search engines’ ability to harm
competition. But a regulatory solution would apply to search engines generally.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to go back to basics by looking broadly at the
potential harms accruing to consumers from search engine bias.
The FTC is empowered to prevent “deceptive acts or practices.”236 Historically,
the FTC has regarded a false pretense of objectivity as a deceptive practice due to
its tendency to deceive consumers.237 More generally, a 1983 FTC policy statement
establishes three elements that “undergird all deception cases”: there must be (1) a
representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead (2) a reasonable
consumer, and (3) the misleading act must be “likely to affect the consumer's
conduct or decision with regard to a product or service.”238
Undisclosed bias across all search engines, including specialized search
services, has the potential to meet this definition where the bias is premised on a
financial interest. To illustrate why, consider Google. A study showed that college
students were likely to substitute Google search rankings for their own subjective
rankings of search result relevance.239 Other research has indicated that a majority
of search engine users are unaware that financial interests may bias search results,
though an overwhelming majority believe that search engines should disclose this
information.240
Undisclosed bias is unlikely to materially injure users when they are searching
for abstract information like the height of the Empire State Building. Clicking on
an irrelevant link will merely waste a user’s time. But in the context of price
comparison websites, the tendency for users to trust in search results could be much
more pernicious. A user could perceive that the rankings on a price comparison

236. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) (“The
[Federal Trade] Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent . . . unfair
methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”).
237. See STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 22.16 (2012) (citing
various cases where the FTC brought enforcement actions against endorsers who failed to
disclose financial interests); see also Andrew Sinclair, Note, Regulation of Paid Listings in
Internet Search Engines: A Proposal for FTC Action, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 353, 361–62
(2004) (discussing two cases where the FTC secured consent decrees against parties who
claimed to be acting objectively without disclosing financial interests).
238. Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (guidelines attached as appendix).
239. Bing Pan, Helene Hembrooke, Thorsten Joachims, Lori Lorigo, Geri Gay, & Laura
Granka, In Google We Trust: Users’ Decisions on Rank, Position, and Relevance, 12 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 3 (Apr. 2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue3/pan.html.
240. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, A MATTER OF TRUST: WHAT USERS
WANT FROM WEB SITES 17 (2002), available at http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/pdfs/amatter-of-trust.pdf.
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website are an objective ranking of the best products and deals available on the
web. If the price comparison website ranks its results based on pecuniary concerns,
or only includes merchants that pay to be listed, consumers may be misled at a cost
to their wallets. The effect could be similar for location services and travel
websites. Consumers searching for restaurants, hotels, and flights could be unaware
that only those businesses that have paid to be included are listed, or that payment
is a factor in the rankings. These sorts of potential harms are likely the reason that
Google Shopper presently contains disclosures about its paid inclusion model.241
The FTC has already exerted some authority over undisclosed bias. In 2002, the
FTC issued a letter to various search engines regarding paid ranking and paid
inclusion practices.242 The guidelines contained in the letter advised search engines
to
ensure that: (1) any paid ranking search results are distinguished from
non-paid results with clear and conspicuous disclosures; (2) the use of
paid inclusion is clearly and conspicuously explained and disclosed;
and (3) no affirmative statement is made that might mislead consumers
as to the basis on which a search result is generated.243
Thus, under the FTC guidelines, any failure to disclose paid inclusion or ranking is
prohibited.
The FTC’s existing guidelines have never been formally enforced and observers
question whether they are being followed.244 Presently, perhaps due to the likely
failure of an antitrust enforcement action against Google, the FTC is rumored to be
considering revisions to its guidelines.245
Certain improvements to the FTC’s existing guidelines could be made so that
the most pernicious effects of search bias, outlined above, could be mitigated. In
particular, one rule from the now-defunct CRS regulations could be adapted to the
present. The rule provided that “[i]n ordering the information contained in an
integrated display, systems shall not use any factors directly or indirectly relating to
carrier identity.”246 This rule could be adopted by the FTC and modified along the
following lines: “In [collecting and] ordering the information contained in [search
results], [search engines] shall not use any factors directly or indirectly relating to
[the search engine’s pecuniary interests in those results absent a conspicuous
disclosure to users].”247

241. See Sullivan, supra note 50.
242. Commercial Alert Letter, supra note 33. “Paid placement” refers to paying for a
boost in organic search results rankings. Id. “Paid inclusion” refers to placing a website on a
search index when that website would normally have been excluded. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Danny Sullivan, A Letter to the FTC Regarding Search Engine Disclosure
Compliance, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 10, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://searchengineland.com/
a-letter-to-the-ftc-regarding-search-engine-disclosure-124169.
245. Danny Sullivan, SEMPO: FTC Is “Strongly Considering” Review of How Search
Engines Disclose Paid Listings, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 15, 2012, 5:42 PM),
http://searchengineland.com/ftc-considering-search-engine-review-136677.
246. Airline Computer Reservation Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.4(b) (2004).
247. For another approach to FTC regulation—and a discussion of the relative benefits of
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This rule would balance several concerns. First, it does not require search
engines to provide their proprietary search algorithms to private third parties.
Second, it prohibits only bias that is undisclosed. Thus, search engines could still
rank the relevance of web content as they please. Third, it prevents search engines
from misleading consumers by favoring websites in which they have a pecuniary
interest without full disclosure. Fourth, it includes a provision for “collecting”
information, which would prevent a search engine from engaging in bias by
refusing to crawl websites. Fifth, it applies equally to all search engines, whereas
an antitrust remedy would only affect Google. Sixth, it is not limited to “paid
inclusion” or “paid ranking” schemes. Accordingly, own-bias by search engines in
favor of their own products would warrant disclosure. Likewise, other financial
interests beyond direct payment for rankings would warrant disclosure if they affect
search rankings. Seventh, the proposed regulation contains no intrusive mandates
about the format of search results pages or algorithmic formulae, thus alleviating
concerns about federal command-and-control over product development.
In spite of the potential for the proposed regulation to target search bias, several
factors militate against adopting a regulation immediately. First, disclosures like
those currently present on Google Shopper indicate that major actors are willing to
make disclosures without being coerced by agency enforcement. Second, the costs
of regulatory compliance may unnecessarily hamper the growth of newer, smaller
entrants like Blekko and DuckDuckGo. Third, the potential difficulties associated
with enforcing a search bias regulation counsel against engaging in a large scale
enforcement effort without greater certainty as to the feasibility of the
undertaking.248 Fourth, the history of CRS regulation indicates that enforcement
agencies may be prone to mission creep and overregulation when regulating bias.249
Given those considerations, an open dialogue with all interested stakeholders,
including downstream websites, search engines large and small, computer science
experts, and consumers is the most likely path to a worthwhile solution.250
CONCLUSION
Search bias may facially appear to represent the next big thing in antitrust law.
However, these fears are likely overstated. Competition exists in the search engine
market and that competition deters even a dominant search engine from degrading
its search product with biased results. The zero cost to consumers of switching to a
competing search engine further disincentivizes bias. Accordingly, it is likely that
“biased” practices alleged to be anticompetitive today, such as Google’s contextual
use of Google Maps results in searches, are actually welfare-enhancing integrations
that consumers prefer. Welfare-enhancing practices should be encouraged, rather
than discouraged, by antitrust law and regulatory policy in general.
FTC rulemaking versus regulation-by-adjudication—see Sinclair, supra note 237, at 369–77.
248. The troubles associated with enforcing an antitrust decree would also be present in
the context of agency enforcement. See supra text accompanying notes 200–03.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 230–34.
250. See David Balto, The FTC Should Update Search Engine Transparency Guidelines,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2012, 9:14 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidbalto/ftc-search-engines_b_1608901.html (arguing for a collaborative regulatory endeavor
that avoids unduly focusing new rules on the complaints of Google’s competitors).
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Though search bias is a poor fit for antitrust law, the broader problem of
undisclosed financial interests in search rankings warrants the regulatory scrutiny it
is receiving. Regulators should look beyond Google and consider the evidence that
some of Google’s noisiest critics are flouting the existing FTC guidelines to the
potential detriment of consumers.
This Note has proposed a regulation that would target the bias that is most likely
to inflict consumer harm. Nevertheless, in light of myriad concerns associated with
regulating search bias, regulators should have a full, open, and constructive
dialogue with both the industry and the public before embarking on a course of
adversarial enforcement.

